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INTRODUCTION
On 1 February 2019, the US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that his
country had suspended its compliance with the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
Treaty, or INF Treaty, and would withdraw from it within six months. The INF Treaty,
little known outside of arms control and disarmament circles, was a landmark Cold
War agreement between the United States of America and the USSR – the first to ban
an entire category of weapons (ground-based medium- and intermediate-range
missiles). The US withdrawal, announced in dramatic terms by President Donald
Trump in October 2018, followed the claim that Russia had recently developed and
fielded a missile with performances forbidden by the INF Treaty.
The end of this little-known treaty is not anecdotal. Not only will it further strain the
US-Russia relationship and antagonise allies, it will also contribute to the erosion of
what is left of the global arms-control architecture and incentivise arms-race behav-
iours among great powers. In a world where security is increasingly less a question
of multilateral deliberation and rules-based interactions, the end of the INF Treaty is
a further signal that missile technologies are again becoming a venue for competition
between great powers: only this time, at least three are playing the game (United
States, China and Russia) rather than two (United States and USSR). Additionally,
missile technology proliferation has turned into a major dimension of contemporary
battlefield realities, and missile programmes of countries such as Iran and North
Korea continue to pose important diplomatic and non-proliferation challenges.
Meanwhile, Europe is, by and large, left watching as its regional security architecture
erodes. Welcome to what US National Security Advisor John Bolton recently termed
‘a multipolar missile world’.
The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Its diplomatic capital might be better
spent in areas where it could potentially make a difference, rather than in a treaty to
which it is not even party. Existing multilateral regimes and agreements with the EU
or its Member States as parties are already in dire need of reinforcement in the face
of technological progress, a volatile diplomatic environment and self-centred,
competitive political narratives. These include, inter alia, the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) framework (including its Structured
Dialogue), multilateral export control regimes (MECR) like the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR), transparency and trust-building mechanisms like the Hague
Code of Conduct against missile proliferation (HCoC), and nuclear-related frame-
works like the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA or ‘Iran deal’) or the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Process.
These, however, may simply fail to meet the challenge of a multipolar missile world.
Renewed efforts, both conceptual and in the realm of capabilities, are needed in a
NATO framework to reinforce the linkage between deterrence and diplomacy.2
EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR MISSILE WORLDNATO-EU dialogue and cooperation on defence issues could be further enhanced,
and European countries should work more with like-minded partners at both bilat-
eral or multilateral levels on the challenges of non-proliferation and disarmament in
the twenty-first century. The demise of the INF Treaty should therefore re-energise
the debate on European strategic autonomy, help support collective capability
building – not least in NATO – and prompt new discussions on stronger multilateral
rules on missile development, use and proliferation.3
1. WHAT IS THE INF TREATY?
1.1. Context and negotiations
Starting in 1976, the Soviet Union introduced new intermediate-range missiles to its
arsenal. They were feeding into what was then referred to as ‘theatre nuclear force’
(TNF), i.e. nuclear weapons destined for a non-strategic (regional) role. The SS-20
‘Saber’, as NATO called them, were based on a larger, yet unsuccessful, interconti-
nental ballistic missile (ICBM) programme and constituted a net improvement over
the missiles they replaced: the SS-4 and SS-5. They were more accurate and more
concealable. They had solid propellant engines, meaning they did not require the
complex and time-consuming pre-launch fuelling operations of their liquid-fuelled
predecessors. They were carried on mobile launchers and could carry several
warheads (Mod 2) instead of just one (Mods 1 and 3). The SS-20, in other words,
dramatically improved the Soviet nuclear posture. These missiles could strike almost
any target in Europe but could not reach the continental United States. Their range
and short time-to-target made them appear as both challenging to NATO unity and
utterly destabilising.
NATO’s response to this challenge became known as the ‘dual track’: on the one
hand, the alliance decided to modernise its own TNF by fielding new American
medium-range Pershing II missiles and BGM-109G Ground-Launched Cruise missiles
(GLCM). On the other hand, Washington agreed to negotiate an arms control agree-
ment with Moscow on these types of missiles. The two tracks were seen in 1979 by
the NATO Foreign and Defence ministers as ‘parallel and complementary’: TNF
modernisation was, in their view, ‘necessary to meet NATO’s deterrence and
defence needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments,
and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF’.1
The dual-track policy was met with considerable criticism by important constituen-
cies in several European countries. Pacifist movements protested the arms race,
fearing more from a military escalation than from Soviet missiles alone. This came to
be known as the Euromissile crisis.2 A rift had emerged between ‘Atlanticists’ and
‘pro-Europeans’, the former emphasising the central role of credible deterrence and
NATO unity in the face of Soviet threats, and the latter preferring to talk of a neces-
sary détente with arms control and disarmament as a priority.
1 NATO press communiqué M2 (79) 22 on the ‘Double-Track’ Decision on theatre nuclear forces (Brussels, 12
December 1979).
2 Arié Zaks, Bernard Adam and Anne De Muelenaere, Le dossier des euro-missiles. Brussels: GRIP, 1981.4
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event of a Soviet attack with conventional forces, the United States might not want
to use their ICBMs in the defence of Europe) was a strong insistence on arms control
talks by European allies. Partly to address European fears, American negotiators
dropped the term ‘theatre nuclear force’ in favour of ‘intermediate-range nuclear
force’.3
In November 1981, US President Ronald Reagan offered the ‘zero option’, which
entailed the dismantlement of Soviet SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20. The United States would
reciprocate by refraining to deploy its own intermediate-range missiles in Europe.
Two years of talks failed to deliver a positive outcome, and in 1983, the negotiations
broke down. They resumed in 1986, alongside discussions on strategic weapons
(START I). By 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev had found common ground. In December,
they signed the ‘Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles’, aka the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty or ‘INF
Treaty’.
1.2. The significance of the INF Treaty
The INF Treaty banned all (ballistic and cruise) land-based medium- and interme-
diate-range missiles. Any such missile, with a range between 500 and 5,500 km,
would be scrapped. Washington and Moscow further agreed never to possess,
produce or flight-test more of them. The treaty did not ban ICBMs or smaller-range
weapons. Sea-based and air-delivered missiles were also excluded from the treaty.
The INF Treaty instituted a special verification commission (SVC) where both parties
could discuss the implementation of its provisions. In effect, the treaty led to the
dismantling of no less than 2,692 missiles (1,846 Soviet missiles and 846 US missiles).
These features made it a remarkable achievement in the realm of nuclear disarma-
ment. They also contributed to making it a mainstay of European security.
In terms of the INF Treaty’s success in disarmament talks, it was significant enough
that the two countries with the largest nuclear stockpiles committed to ban an entire
class of weapon. Trust and verification, of course, always constituted key issues in
negotiations as in implementation, but they were addressed by the treaty in an
innovative way. INF Treaty provisions included – and this was a breakthrough – a
regime of intrusive on-site inspections; they also covered data exchange and
monitoring mechanisms. It is also significant that European members of NATO
pushed for the Euromissile negotiations to be conducted in relation to the strategic
3 Paul Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the center of decision. A Memoir. New York: Grove Weidenfeld,
1989, p. 369.5
EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR MISSILE WORLDlevel: the 1979 NATO declaration called for TNF discussions to be integrated in the
‘SALT III process’. After the failure of SALT II, it became tied to the American START
proposal.4
These connections imply that the INF Treaty is not an ad hoc agreement and never
was. Rather, it was a pioneering exercise and an integral part of a wider arms control
corpus. The INF Treaty thereby constitutes an important contribution to the disarma-
ment obligation covered by Article VI of the NPT.5 In 2001, when inspections ended,
parties to the INF Treaty argued: ‘the experience accumulated in the course of
inspection activities under the INF Treaty will undoubtedly be used in future bilateral
and multilateral negotiations on arms control and disarmament’.6
On European security, the INF Treaty provided more than a strong symbol. It came
as the culmination of a long and complex political and diplomatic process within
NATO first and between the United States and Russia second. In a Cold War context,
the tensions, debates and negotiations leading to the conclusion of the INF Treaty
had put on display much of what simultaneously drew together and antagonised
NATO allies. Once concluded, the INF Treaty-warranted verifiable destruction of
intermediate-range missiles was a strong contribution to a more peaceful European
environment. Decoupling was less an issue for the alliance, and destabilising
weapons were not just scrapped: they were forbidden as long as the treaty would
hold. In operational terms, their elimination meant that the nuclear threshold for
military operations in Europe had been heightened.
In the immediate post-Cold War context, the INF Treaty remained a pillar of US-
Russia disarmament talks. However, the erosion of the arms control and disarma-
ment practices of the bipolar world was difficult to avoid, given the development of
new missile threats from ‘rogue states’ (including Iran and North Korea), the deteri-
orating relationship between Moscow and Washington, and the ambitious missile
programmes of rising powers (most importantly, China). An important milestone was
reached in 2002, when the Bush administration withdrew from the treaty on the
limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems or ‘ABM Treaty’, a critical Cold War agree-
ment focused on strategic equilibrium between the two great powers. To motivate
4 The SALT, or ‘Strategic Arms Limitation Talks’, process covered two rounds of negotiations between the
United States and the USSR over their respective strategic arsenals, taking place between 1969 and 1979.
SALT I produced the ABM Treaty, while SALT II produced an agreement that the US Congress refused to
ratify in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Prospects for a SALT III agreement then evaporated.
In the 1990s, bilateral talks resumed and produced two treaties: START, or ‘Strategic Arms Reduction Trea-
ties’, I and II. START II never entered into effect.
5 Article VI of the NPT states: ‘Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good
faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective interna-
tional control’.
6 ‘Officials Mark End of INF Treaty Inspections’, Arms Control Association, 1 June 2001: www.armscon-
trol.org/node/2873.6
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defend against new missile threats, notably from Iran,7 but also from Russia.
Other agreements have similarly been discredited over time. For instance, the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, signed in 1990, put equal limits
on deployed military troops and equipment from Warsaw Pact countries and NATO
allies: both sides agreed to not have more than 20,000 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces,
30,000 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), 6,800 combat aircraft and 2,000 attack
helicopters each in the zone covered by the treaty (Europe, from the Atlantic to the
Urals). A regime of inspections was instituted, based on a system of quotas. Naval
assets were kept out of the treaty’s scope. But the end of the Cold War meant in
practice that there was an almost immediate discrepancy with the CFE Treaty’s text
and rationale on the one hand, and current issues on the other. Worsening relations
between NATO countries and Russia, with Russian troop deployments in Moldova
and Georgia and NATO’s enlargement as focal points, led Moscow to suspend its
compliance with the treaty in 2007 and pull out completely in 2015.
As another example, the Open Skies Treaty signed in 1992 provided its parties with
the right to conduct reconnaissance flights in one another’s airspace. This important
confidence-building measure is ‘at an impasse’8 because of Russian restrictions over
Kaliningrad and Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and because of corresponding
measures by the United States. Discussions are ongoing, but in the United States,
funding for treaty-related equipment remains an issue – demonstrating how difficult
the political conversation over such a treaty may be.9
1.3. The INF today: claims and counter-claims
Like most Cold War arms control agreements, the INF Treaty lost its lustre over its
three decades of existence. Firstly, the INF suffered from the ups and downs of the
US-Russia post-Cold War relationship. Russian officials have repeatedly cited the
deployment of US missile defence systems in Central Europe as a motive for possible
withdrawal. Not just missile defence, but also NATO’s enlargement and the War on
Terror contributed to antagonise the two countries during the Bush administration,
with arms control agreements suffering a first important blow. The US-Russia ‘reset’
attempted in 2009-2012 delivered the New START treaty, imposing limits on the
7 The ABM Treaty signed in 1972 put limits on the deployment and development of missile defence systems.
Its rationale was that missile defence systems could provide the country which developed it with a first
strike capability, i.e. the possibility to launch a nuclear attack on the enemy’s nuclear sites and intercept the
remaining retaliatory missiles, and as such were fuelling escalation.
8 Aaron Mehta, ‘US, Russia remain at “impasse” over Open Skies treaty flights’, Defense News, 14 September
2018: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/09/14/us-russia-remain-at-impasse-over-nuclear-treaty-
flights/.
9 Kingston Reif, ‘US Reverses Course on Open Skies Treaty’, Arms Control Association, October 2018: https://
www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-10/news/us-reverses-course-open-skies-treaty.7
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launchers. But the reset was short-lived, and its failure left both governments
frustrated at the actual state of affairs between them.10 The wars in Iraq and Libya
also took their toll, and Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and military operations in
Ukraine, as well as its intervention in Syria, pushed the relationship to a new low in
more recent years.
Secondly, the (mostly11) bilateral scope of the INF Treaty had been pointed out by
both Russian12 and American13 policymakers as skewed and problematic. China,
India, Pakistan, Iran and North Korea all developed their own ballistic and cruise
missile forces unconstrained by INF provisions. In February 2007, Russian President
Vladimir Putin seized the argument to hint at his country’s dissatisfaction with INF.14
In the United States, comparable concerns have led to a similar frustration. In
October 2007, Moscow and Washington even made a joint declaration at the United
Nations calling on ‘all interested countries to discuss the possibility of imparting a
global character to this important regime’.15 However, the prospects of INF ‘univer-
salisation’ have never really been gauged to be very good, neither by Russia nor the
United States.
These reservations have only grown more salient in recent years, with both lines of
argument being picked up to justify a possible withdrawal from the treaty. A further
event triggered the current standoff: the United States accused Russia of being in
breach of the INF Treaty by having developed an intermediate-range cruise missile.
Starting in 2014, this claim appeared in annual compliance reports by the State
Department. By 2017, it was clarified that the missile the United States considered
to be non-compliant with the INF Treaty was the Novator 9M729, or SSC-8: a ground-
launched cruise missile similar to its naval version, the SS-N-30A (3M-14 Kalibr16).
10 See, e.g. Mikhail Zygar, All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of Vladimir Putin. New York: Public Affairs,
2016.
11 After the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States sought to secure the participation of no fewer than 12
former Soviet republics it considered as successor states (to the exclusion of the Baltic states). See: ‘Treaty
Between The United States Of America And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Elimination Of
Their Intermediate-Range And Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty)’, US Department of State: https://
www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm [last accessed 29 January 2019]
12 Stephen Blank, ‘Russian Military Policy in Asia: A Study in Paradox’, RUFS Briefing No. 20, September 2013:
https://www.foi.se/download/18.7fd35d7f166c56ebe0bacfa/1542369055969/RUFS-20_Russian-military-
policy-in-Asia_FOI-Memo-4580.pdf.
13 John Bolton and John Yoo, ‘An Obsolete Nuclear Treaty Even Before Russia Cheated’, Wall Street Journal, 9
September 2014: https://www.wsj.com/articles/john-bolton-and-john-yoo-an-obsolete-nuclear-treaty-
even-before-russia-cheated-1410304847.
14 Luke Harding, ‘Putin threatens withdrawal from cold war nuclear treaty’, The Guardian, 12 October 2007:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/oct/12/russia.usa1.
15 ‘Joint US-Russian Statement on the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles at the 62nd Session of the UN General Assembly’, US Department of State Archive, 25 October
2007: https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/oct/94141.htm.
16 The ‘Kalibr’ is a family of a dozen types of missiles launched by surface combatants as well as from subma-
rines, which includes, besides the SS-N-30A, the SS-N-27 Sizzler and ‘Klub’ export versions.8
EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR MISSILE WORLDThe 9M729, according to NATO sources, bears a total resemblance to the sea-
launched Kalibr,17 a missile that became an instant ‘celebrity’ in 2015 when Russian
ships fired salvos of them at targets in Syria from ships and submarines in the Black
Sea and the Mediterranean.18 The Kalibr has a range of between 1,000 and 2,500
km19 – Russia may even seek to double that range20 – but it is compliant with the INF
Treaty because it is launched from the sea.21 In fact, Russian naval forces have made
the integration of the Kalibr in small and large vessels, as well as in submarines, a
priority. Putting such a missile on small surface combatants such as the 950 tons
Buyan-M class corvette (Project 21631), means that Russia is, in effect, capable of
conducting long-range strike missions from inland waterways. In Gressel’s words,
‘this means that during, for example, an escalating crisis in the Baltic region, Russia
could threaten Berlin, Paris, and London using vessels in the port of Kronstadt or the
rivers around St Petersburg’.22 The importance of the Kalibr to the Russian Navy is
such that experts mention this as the ‘Kalibr-isation’ of the fleet.23
A possible scenario would be that Russia converted the Kalibr into a road-mobile
version and integrated it to its Iskander system (the system carries the missiles as
well as various support and combat management systems on wheeled vehicles). The
Iskander system includes ballistic and cruise missiles: the Iskander-M and Iskander-K
respectively. On the one hand, the Iskander-M (NATO reporting name SS-26 ‘Stone’)
ballistic missiles are most famous for replacing ‘Scud’ ballistic missiles (it also
replaced the OTR23 ‘Oka’ that the USSR agreed to destroy under the INF Treaty).24
On the other, the Iskander-K cruise missiles would include the 9M728 (or ‘R-500’) as
well as the newer and bigger 9M729. The 9M729, according to US sources, was
tested at prohibited range at least six times before being deployed; it is now
supposed to be operational in four battalions.25
17 Missile Defense Project, ‘SSC-8 (Novator 9M729),’ Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, published 23 October 2018, last modified 23 January 2019: https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/
ssc-8-novator-9m729/.
18 Richard Johnson, ‘How Russia fired missiles at Syria from 1,000 miles away’, The Washington Post, 23
October 2015: www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/world/russian-cruise-missile/.
19 The Russian Navy: A Historic Transition. Washington DC: The Office of Naval Intelligence, December 2015:
www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/russia/Russia%202015screen.pdf?ver=2015-12-14-
082028-313.
20 Mark Episkopos, ‘Russia’s Dangerous “Kalibr” Cruise Missile Could See Range Doubled: Report’, The
National Interest, 12 January 2019: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/russias-dangerous-%E2%80%
9Ckalibr%E2%80%9D-cruise-missile-could-see-range-doubled-report-41427.
21 Missile Defense Project, ‘SS-N-30A (3M-14 Kalibr),’ Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International
Studies, published 11 August 2016, last modified 15 June 2018: https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-n-
30a/.
22 Gustav Gressel, ‘Under the gun: Rearmament for arms control in Europe’, ECFR Policy Brief, 28 November
2018: www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/under_the_gun_rearmament_for_arms_control_in_europe.
23 Igor Delanoë, Marine de Guerre Russe: Atouts et Faiblesses d’un Outil en Mutation. Paris: Note de l’Observ-
atoire Franco-Russe, N° 17, March 2018: http://obsfr.ru/fileadmin/Policy_paper/PP_17_FR_Delanoe.pdf.
24 Missile Defense Project, ‘SS-26 (Iskander),’ Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
published 27 September 2016, last modified 19 June 2018, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/ss-26/.
25 Ankit Panda, ‘US Intelligence: Russia Tried to Con the World With Bogus Missile’, The Daily Beast, 18
February 2019: https://www.thedailybeast.com/us-intelligence-russia-tried-to-con-the-world-with-bogus-
missile.9
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allies26 and NATO itself endorsed the US position.27 For the United States, the 9M729
clearly does more than undermine the INF Treaty; it is a destabilising move from
Russia with ample security ramifications requiring support and unity from allies.
Meanwhile, Russia considered the American accusations unfounded and pointed
instead at US ballistic missile defence systems in Europe, especially the Mk41
launchers of NATO’s AEGIS Ashore system in Romania, which it says can easily be
reconfigured to launch cruise missiles.28
For European countries, things are a bit more complicated. French experts have
argued that the end of the INF Treaty appears more concerning than the deployment
of 9M729 itself: Europe is faced with various other nuclear-capable, smaller-range
missiles (the ground-launched Iskander missiles, the air-launched Kh101/102 and
sea-launched Kalibr) anyway, so the consequences of the current US-Russia spat are
mostly political.29 For German experts, the 9M729 aims to divide ranks within NATO
and may well succeed in doing so.30 Both studies concur on three things (at least):
that European agency in this debate is very limited; that the current situation will
renew questions on the future of NATO’s nuclear deterrent; and that the demise of
the INF Treaty is detrimental to arms control agreements in general – no matter what
opinion one has of their effectiveness.
26 In November 2018, the Dutch Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, Stef Blok and Ank Bijleveld-
Schouten, confirmed to their national parliament that they could independently attest to Russia’s violation
of the INF. See: ‘Kamerbrief Nederlandse conclusie over de Russische schending van het INF-verdrag (Inter-
mediate-Range Nuclear Forces)’, available for download here: www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-
van-buitenlandse-zaken/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/11/27/kamerbrief-nederlandse-conclusie-over-
de-russische-schending-van-het-inf-verdrag-intermediate-range-nuclear-forces.
27 ‘Statement by the North Atlantic Council on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty’,
NATO.org, 15 December 2017; ‘Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the
meeting of the NATO-Russia Council’, NATO.org, 25 January 2019.
28 Russia also brought up the use of intermediate range systems as missile targets and the delivery of
weapons by drones as additional cases of potential treaty violations by the United States. For a rebuttal,
see: Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Factsheet Factsheet – Refuting Russian Allega-
tions of US Noncompliance with the INF Treaty, 8 December 2017: www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/
276360.htm Also see: Thomas Moore, ‘Russia Claims US INF Violations: A Wonk’s Démarche’, Arms Control
Wonk, 4 August 2014: www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/604740/russia-claims-u-s-inf-violations-a-
wonks-demarche/
29 Bruno Tertrais et al., ‘La mort annoncée du traité FNI ou la fin de l’après-Guerre froide’, Notes de la FRS
N°02/2019, February 2019: www.frstrategie.org/publications/notes/la-mort-annoncee-du-traite-fni-ou-la-
fin-de-l-apres-guerre-froide-02-2019.
30 Heinrich Brauß and Christian Mölling, ‘Deterrence and Arms Control. Europe’s Security without the INF
Treaty: Political and Strategic Options for Germany and NATO’, DGAP Kompact, 02/2019, February 2019.10
2. A BILATERAL COLD WAR TREATY IN 
A ‘MULTIPOLAR MISSILE WORLD’
2.1. Evolution and proliferation of missile technologies
There is more to the INF Treaty than the Russia-US and US-NATO conundrum. The
decay of the INF Treaty had not been lost on observers: it could hardly adjust to post-
Cold War realities, including both the United States and Russia’s heightened sense of
vulnerability vis-à-vis the missile programmes of China and others. Defending against
the missile threats of both ‘revisionist powers’ and ‘rogue states’ is the central theme
of the 2019 US Missile Defense Review (MDR).31 Little known by the wider public, the
treaty remained on the screen of arms control specialists but appeared, at least in
some quarters, increasingly out of sync with a world where new ‘missile races’ might
be in the making. In Moscow, where he held talks with President Vladimir Putin and
Foreign Minister Serguei Lavrov on the issue, US National Security Advisor John
Bolton declared that the INF ‘was a Cold War bilateral ballistic missile-related treaty
in a multipolar ballistic missile world’.32
Bolton was right to highlight two things: that the INF was a distinct product of the
Cold War, and that we are now in a world where missile technologies have prolifer-
ated. New technologies have brought about new prospects for missile development.
China, for instance, was the first country to deploy anti-ship ballistic missiles, the
much-discussed DF-21 D ‘carrier killer’ and the longer-range DF-26.33 More funda-
mentally, Beijing’s arsenal of medium- and intermediate-range missiles is a pillar of
the country’s defence policy and military strategy.34 It even elevated its missile
branch, the Second Artillery Force, to the level of a ‘service’, alongside the Navy, Air
Force and Army in 2015: it is now the ‘People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’
(PLARF).35 Not only do these capabilities provide a strong deterrent against US naval
operations in the Western Pacific, they also provide a strong hedge against regional
31 Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2019 Missile Defense Review. Available at: https://media.defense.gov/
2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF.
32 Michael Kofman, ‘Under the Missile’s Shadow: What does the Passing of the INF Treaty Mean?’, War on the
Rocks, 26 October 2018: https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/under-the-missiles-shadow-what-does-the-
passing-of-the-inf-treaty-mean/.
33 Andrew S. Erickson, ‘China Reveals Two “Carrier-Killer” Missiles,’ The National Interest, 3 September 2015:
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/showtime-china-reveals-two-carrier-killer-missiles-13769.
34 See, e.g.: Jacob Stokes and Alec Blivas, ‘China’s Missile Program and Potential US Withdrawal from the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty’, US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff
Research Report, 28 January 2019.
35 Adam Ni and Bates Gill, ‘China’s New Missile Force: New Ambitions, New Challenges (Part 1)’, China Brief,
18 (14), August 2018: https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-missile-force-new-ambitions-new-chal-
lenges-part-1/; Adam Ni and Bates Gill, ‘China’s New Missile Force: New Ambitions, New Challenges (Part
2)’, China Brief, 18 (15), September 2018: https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-new-missile-force-new-
ambitions-new-challenges-part-2/.11
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concrete terms, it has been argued that if China were to subscribe to INF provisions,
95% of its missiles would have to be scrapped.36 Similarly, for India and Pakistan,
medium- and intermediate-range missiles have a distinct role to play in their overall
defence posture and strategy. This is not to speak of Iran and North Korea, whose
ballistic programmes have been the object of numerous condemnations and
sanctions by the United Nations (UN) and other international actors.
The threat of sophisticated cruise missiles, integrating stealth materials and
advanced propulsion, guiding and targeting systems, will likely grow in salience. The
reason the maritime- and air-launched versions of cruise missiles were not prohib-
ited by the INF Treaty in 1987 is that their launch platforms are easier to locate and
track than a land-based system which can be easily concealed in periods of crisis and
launched at very short notice. Furthermore, very few command, control and commu-
nication arrangements are required, rendering deployment of the missile system
much more destabilising. Neutralising a cruise missile in flight is very difficult as it
requires very sophisticated and networked systems, including powerful sensors,
rapid data link and the necessary interceptors.
Meanwhile, hypersonic technologies have become a new topic of concern. These
technologies mainly come in two forms: railguns and missiles. Railguns use high
electromagnetic force rather than conventional propellants to fire rounds at much
greater speeds than traditional guns. They would considerably upgrade the range,
velocity and precision of long-range artillery fires, but still face major technological
hurdles related to the production, storing and command of the huge electric power
they require. Apparently, China is the first country in the world to have tested opera-
tionally such a railgun, and it may be fielding one by 2025.37
Hypersonic missiles are missiles capable of flying at five times the speed of sound or
faster. There are two kinds: cruise missiles (using a scramjet engine to reach high
speeds) and glide vehicles (released from a missile into near space and gliding to the
target). The velocity and manoeuvrability of both types mean that they would defeat
any existing missile defence systems. That was exactly what Russian President
Vladimir Putin emphasised when he announced that his country had successfully
tested its Avanguard hypersonic missile.38 Should such missiles carry nuclear
warheads, they would be very difficult to discriminate from conventional missiles.
36 Statement of Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., US Navy Commander, US Pacific Command Before the Senate
Armed Services Committee on US Pacific Command Posture, 27 April 2017. Available at: https://
www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Harris_04-27-17.pdf.
37 David Axe, ‘China’s Navy Railgun Is Out for Sea Trials. Here’s Why It’s a Threat to the US Navy.’, The National
Interest, 6 January 2019: https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-navy-railgun-out-sea-trials-heres-
why-it’s-threat-us-navy-40812.
38 Nikolai Novichkov, ‘Russia announces successful flight test of Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle’, Jane’s, 3
January 2019: https://www.janes.com/article/85511/russia-announces-successful-flight-test-of-avangard-
hypersonic-glide-vehicle.12
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leave possible defenders very little time (and actual data) to respond: retaliatory
strikes would have to be decided on highly speculative grounds. Research on hyper-
sonic missiles is ongoing in at least three countries: Russia,40 China41 and the United
States.42
Parallel with these high-tech bids on the future of deterrence, and of more salience
to the problem of a ‘multipolar missile world’, is the proliferation of sophisticated
missile systems and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or ‘drones’). Ballistic and cruise
missile technologies are more readily available to non-state actors and lesser
powers: suffice it to mention the ballistic missile campaign used by the Houthi rebels
in Yemen against Saudi Arabia. Defence against modified ‘Scuds’ and modified
surface-to-air missiles has been a major challenge for the Kingdom, necessitating a
major – and yet not very successful – effort in missile defence.43 Meanwhile, UAV
technologies have dramatically spread. Drones are an integral and growing part of
contemporary battlefield realities. For instance, Russian forces operating from the
Hmeimim air base in Syria have claimed to face numerous attacks from drones
loaded with explosives.44
Such developments undoubtedly require an adapted response, which the INF was,
for all intents and purposes, unable to provide. In this, Bolton had a point. Being the
only party committing to a bilateral treaty is also not a sustainable option. In this, the
US administration has another point (and Russia does not claim otherwise, although
it lays the blame squarely on Washington). However, this line of argument
completely bypasses the multilateral efforts that have since taken place on the issue,
and their potential for addressing current arms control and disarmament issues.
39 Richard H. Speier, George Nacouzi, Carrie A. Lee, Richard M. Moore, Hypersonic Missile Nonproliferation.
Hindering the Spread of a New Class of Weapons. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2017.
40 Vladimir Isachenkov (AP), ‘Putin: Russia has enough missiles without violating treaty, and nobody has
hypersonic weapons like theirs’, Military Times, 18 December 2018: www.militarytimes.com/news/your-
military/2018/12/18/putin-russia-has-enough-missiles-without-violating-treaty-and-nobody-has-hyper-
sonic-weapons-like-theirs/; Brad Lennon, ‘Russia’s “invulnerable” nuclear missile ready to deploy, Putin
says’, CNN, 27 December 2018.
41 Minnie Chan, ‘China fires up advanced hypersonic missile challenge to US defences’, South China Morning
Post, 1 January 2018: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2126420/china-fires-
advanced-hypersonic-missile-challenge-us.
42 Aaron Mehta, ‘Air Force awards nearly $1 billion contract for a hypersonic cruise missile’, Defense News, 18
April 2018: www.defensenews.com/air/2018/04/18/air-force-taps-lockheed-for-new-hypersonic-cruise-
missile/.
43 ‘Doubt cast on Saudi claims of Houthi missile interception’, Al Jazeera, 28 March 2018: www.aljazeera.com/
news/2018/03/doubt-cast-saudi-claims-houthi-missile-interception-180326124054084.html.
44 ‘Russian airbase in Syria destroys 45 drones over past month: ministry’, Xinhua, 17 August 2018: http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-08/17/c_137396342.htm.13
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The INF Treaty did not address the developments of a ‘multipolar missile world’ and
it was not designed to do so. Russia’s argument that US drones actually meet the
definition of ground-launched cruise missiles under the INF Treaty illustrates this gap
between text and stakes.
Ballistic missile proliferation is a longstanding and, arguably, growing concern for the
international community. In 1987, the same year the INF Treaty was signed, G7
states agreed to set up a multilateral mechanism instituting a common set of rules
and standards in their trade of missile systems and technology: the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Members of the MTCR pledge to review criti-
cally (‘exercise restraint’ in) any export of missiles, as well as associated parts and
technologies, that would either have a range of 300 km or more and a payload of 500
kg or more (the ‘300/500 threshold’), or be capable of delivering weapons of mass
destruction (including nuclear, biological or chemical warheads). The MTCR has, in
effect, established a strong non-proliferation norm and is credited with many non-
proliferation successes, mostly during the 1990s and early 2000s45.
However, the MTCR only targets exports of sensitive technologies: a missile devel-
oped domestically would not be bound by its provisions. The recent Arms Trade
Treaty (ATT), which entered into force in 2014, similarly focuses on international
transfers rather than on weapons themselves: it establishes common standards for
the international trade in conventional weapons, including missiles and missile
launchers.
The problem lies yet again with adapting to a fast-changing technological and indus-
trial landscape. Should the MTCR not specifically address hypersonic technologies,
the risk may be that the regime fails to curb their proliferation. There is already a
precedent with UAVs. The MTCR did not prevent drone proliferation, not least by
non-MTCR members China and Israel, and American criticism over what is perceived
as biased restrictions (drones are marketed with payloads just inferior to 500 kg) is
growing.46 And so does the frustration of US policymakers who believe that Russia’s
position within the MTCR obstructs reform.47
Countries like China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran or Israel developed their own
missile programmes outside the MTCR framework, and outstanding cases of
45 Leonard S. Spector, ‘The Missile Technology Control Regime and Shifting Proliferation Challenges’, Arms
Control Association, 1 April 2018: www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-04/features/missile-technology-control-
regime-shifting-proliferation-challenges#endnote02.
46 See, e.g. George Nacouzi et al., Assessment of the Proliferation of Certain Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.
Response to Section 1276 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017. Santa Monica:
Rand Corporation, 2018: https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2369.html.
47 Michael C. Horowitz & Andro Mathewson, ‘A way to rein in drone proliferation’, The Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists, 30 November 2018: https://thebulletin.org/2018/11/a-way-to-rein-in-drone-proliferation/.14
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Korean and Iranian ballistic programmes, or North Korean and Iranian proliferation
activities, including to Yemen and Syria) have cast a crude light on the regime’s
limitations. In 2002, the same year the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty,
the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC) was estab-
lished as an initiative spearheaded by MTCR members seeking to bring as many
countries as possible to subscribe to transparency and confidence-building measures
in their space and ballistic missiles programmes. It has now gathered 139 signatories
– a much-needed development but one that similarly lacks enforcement mecha-
nisms: the HCoC is explicitly ‘politically binding’.
These multilateral mechanisms thus appear to be limited in both diplomatic (not all
countries with potentially problematic missile programmes are part of them) and
technical range (the difficulty of addressing the different capabilities of different
classes and kinds of missiles, not to mention the all-important ‘dual-use’ nature of
associated technologies). But they still serve a purpose. China, Israel and Pakistan
have since pledged on numerous occasions support to the MTCR and committed to
observe its guidelines, while India joined the regime in 2016. International sanctions
against North Korea and Iran have used MTCR guidelines and annexes.
Enforcements of arms control agreements have always constituted the difficult part
of diplomatic and political negotiations. In a world where missile technology is fast
changing and further proliferating, new rules are warranted. But previous agree-
ments have set useful precedents. They instituted mechanisms and principles that
can still be of value in new, multilateral frameworks. Discarding such agreements as
obsolete remnants of the Cold War does not help in charting a course for addressing
the challenges of a multipolar missile world. Experience shows that when legal
obligations go, so do the competences. More than ever, creative thinking over arms
control enforcement mechanisms is needed, and experts of the INF Treaty have a fair
share of insights and experience to contribute to the contemporary debate.
In a world headed toward possible new ‘missile races’, the weakness of the multilat-
eral arms control architecture puts a premium on new capability-building efforts that
the demise of the INF Treaty can only further heighten. It is likely that more and more
countries will invest in missile defence as missile threats augment and diversify, but
capability development in this realm is both extremely costly and not extremely
reliable in operational conditions (given the tremendous technological challenges
associated with intercepting missiles).
The demise of the INF Treaty does not fundamentally alter the parameters of a ‘new
missile world’. It rather demonstrates the shifting priorities of those countries most
concerned about it: less investment in diplomacy and multilateral frameworks and
more concentration on ‘hard power’ instruments; less concertation and more deter-
rence; and ultimately less transparency and more great-power politics.15
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What had long been a very technical conversation, featuring many more considera-
tions than those listed above, suddenly turned into a hot political issue in October
2018 when US President Trump made public his intention to ‘terminate’ the INF
Treaty. While claims of treaty violations were neither new nor anecdotal, the timing
of this announcement had a significant impact on its reception in Europe. It came on
the heels of a series of treaty-busting initiatives by the Trump administration,48 most
notably its withdrawal from the Paris agreement and the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA) or Iran deal.
An inescapable corollary has been a renewed questioning on the future of New
START, the only treaty that puts a cap on the strategic arsenals of the world’s two
biggest nuclear powers: a treaty that the US president unsurprisingly considered a
‘one-sided deal’ and a ‘bad deal’.49 A series of diplomatic consultations were neces-
sary to clarify the US position on the INF and avoid a ‘spill-over effect’ from other
issues and forums. But interrogations over New START remain.
A first and all-important implication of the demise of the INF Treaty would therefore
be a blow to the global disarmament agenda. In recent years, the global conversation
on nuclear disarmament has been much less focused on delivery vehicles (i.e.
missiles, for the most part) than on force postures and on the humanitarian conse-
quences of nuclear explosions. This may contribute to further polarising a debate
that is already heated. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) review process appears
stalled, much like the work of the UN Conference on Disarmament (CD), as most
nuclear powers commit to the modernisation of their arsenals. The countries and
civil society organisations that grew frustrated with this approach and have long
called for an actual break from the past sponsored a new treaty: the Treaty on the
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), which was passed in 2017. In the current
situation, the ‘realistic’ and incremental approach advocated by those who favour
existing disarmament formats (NPT mainly) and the ‘optimistic’ approach of TPNW
supporters appear less and less amenable to compromise. The demise of INF will
provide additional arguments to both sides and will probably further entrench their
respective positions.
A second implication is, beyond the global disarmament agenda, the erosion of trust
in arms control agreements in general. The demise of the INF Treaty undermines the
US stated ambition of reaching a tougher ‘nuclear deal’ with Iran – one that would
48 Scott R. Anderson, ‘Walking Away from the World Court’, Lawfare, 5 October 2018: https://www.lawfare-
blog.com/walking-away-world-court.
49 Aaron Mehta, ‘One nuclear treaty is dead. Is New START next?’, Defense News, 23 October 2018: https://
www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/10/23/one-nuclear-treaty-is-dead-is-new-start-next/; Robbie
Gramer and Lara Seligman, ‘The INF Treaty Is Dead. Is New START Next?’, Foreign Policy, 1 February 2019:
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/01/the-inf-treaty-is-dead-is-new-start-next-russia-arms/.16
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North Korea’s denuclearisation. Both endeavours were already considered close to
impossible before October 2018. Prospects of arms control discussions with other
actors, including China, have also been profoundly damaged.50 Furthermore,
questions over the extension of New START have only become more salient.
A third implication is the dreaded, if still remote, prospect of a new ‘Euromissiles
crisis’. The demise of INF comes with the question as to whether the Pentagon would
develop and field its own ground-launched intermediate-range missile system. The
National Defense Authorization Acts for Fiscal Years 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 all
call for the development of military options in response to Russia’s treaty violations.
In particular, in the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act
of 2017, Congress is asking the Department of Defense to ‘report on the cost,
schedule and feasibility to modify the Tomahawk, Standard Missile-3, Standard
Missile-6, Long-Range Stand Off Cruise Missile, and Army Tactical Missile System
missiles for ground-launch with [INF] range; and [to] report on the number and
location of AEGIS Ashore sites with anti-air warfare capability necessary in Asia and
Europe to defend US forces and allies from Russian ground launched missile
systems’.51
The operational need for such a missile is, at best, limited. Testifying before
Congress, General Paul Selva, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said ‘[t]here
are no military requirements we cannot currently satisfy due to our compliance with
the INF Treaty. While there is a military requirement to prosecute targets at ranges
covered by the INF Treaty, those fires do not have to be ground-based. However,
ground-based systems would increase both the operational flexibility and the scale
of our intermediate-range strike capabilities’.52 Basing options for new intermediate-
range missile are the tricky part of this discussion. The Euromissiles crisis had this
issue at its core, and it clearly showed that alliance unity on this question was far
from guaranteed. Basing options in Asia would be no less controversial. For example,
deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defence) missile defence
system in South Korea has been – despite North Korea’s threats – an important polit-
ical and electoral issue in the country; it also put Seoul at loggerheads with Beijing.
While these two precedents (the Euromissiles crisis and oppositions to THAAD
deployment in South Korea) obviously have their fair share of idiosyncrasies and
should not be too readily compared with the current situation, they show how polit-
ically sensitive it would be for any allied country to host US ground-based interme-
50 Bruno Tertrais et al., ‘La mort annoncée du traité FNI ou la fin de l’après-Guerre froide’, op. cit.
51 S.430 – Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty Preservation Act of 2017, 115th Congress (2017-
2018). Available at: www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/430/text.
52 Military Assessment of Nuclear Deterrence Requirements [H.A.S.C. No. 115-11], hearing before the
Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives (1st session), 8 March 2017. Available at:
www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24683/html/CHRG-115hhrg24683.htm.17
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Action Service (EEAS) to issue a statement calling the ‘full and verifiable implemen-
tation’ of the INF Treaty ‘crucial for Europe’s and global security’, and warning that
INF withdrawal may prompt ‘a new arms race’.53
53 ‘Statement on the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in Europe’, EEAS, 22 October 2018: https:/
/eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/52520/statement-treaty-intermediate-range-
nuclear-forces-europe_en.18
3. EUROPE’S OPTIONS
3.1. A limited agency
Since October 2018, European allies have pressed the United States to take more
time before putting an end to their INF Treaty commitments and attempted to
pressure Russia to demonstrate (or return to) compliance with the treaty. French
President Emmanuel Macron reminded his American alter ego of the importance of
the INF Treaty in October 2018, during a phone call.54 German Chancellor Angela
Markel apparently convinced President Trump to delay the withdrawal announce-
ment. Meanwhile, the German Foreign Minister embarked on a last-ditch attempt to
salvage the treaty.55 At the Munich Security Conference, Angela Merkel offered the
opportunity to China, via Yang Jiechi, the director of the Office of Foreign Affairs of
China’s Communist Party (CCP), to participate in discussions over the future of the
INF Treaty.56
The problem is that Europe is not party to the treaty. It therefore has limited leverage
over its future, despite being its principal beneficiary. Back in the 1980s, the threat
perception gap was a major source of irritation between allies and within European
countries. But eventually, through sound diplomacy (not least within a NATO
context), European and American interests merged in a negotiating position vis-à-vis
the USSR. The INF Treaty may have been a bilateral treaty, highlighting the actual
power dynamics of the Cold War but it also constituted a litmus test of transatlantic
security cooperation.
The context is very different in 2019, but intermediate-range missiles are no less a
challenge for transatlantic relations and diplomatic relations with Russia. That
implies that European allies and EU institutions cannot remain quiet on the issue.
Instead of trying to salvage the INF Treaty, European countries should rather invest
in creative thinking over new arms control and disarmament negotiation platforms
and enforcement mechanisms. Part of the challenge is to both find common grounds
among allies and to cooperate effectively with like-minded partners. What could be
the best vehicle for such a programme, and what would be the most promising areas
of cooperation?
54 ‘Communiqué de presse – Entretien téléphonique du Président de la République avec le Président des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique Donald TRUMP’, Elysée, 22 October 2018: www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/
10/22/communique-de-presse-entretien-telephonique-du-president-de-la-republique-avec-le-president-
des-etats-unis-d-amerique-donald-trump.
55 ‘Germany demands Russia verify its commitment to INF missile treaty’, Deutsche Welle, 24 January 2019:
www.dw.com/en/germany-demands-russia-verify-its-commitment-to-inf-missile-treaty/a-47206266.
56 Sebastian Sprenger and Joe Gould, ‘Merkel nudges China to help save the INF Treaty’, Defense News, 17
February 2019.19
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If Europe is serious about its role in supporting multilateral arms control, disarma-
ment and non-proliferation regimes and practices, it needs leverage. This, in turn,
implies defence capabilities. This will not be easy. When French President Emmanuel
Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel emphasised the need for a European
army, in part as a reaction to the anticipated American withdrawal from the INF
Treaty, they were subject to criticism, not least from US President Trump.57
To connect this question of capabilities with diplomacy requires that European
countries figure out a way to make the best out of the existing framework, organise
themselves, liaise with like-minded partners, and reach together a ‘critical mass’
supporting a coherent arms control and disarmament strategy. Problematically,
there is no single venue to do that: NATO is where most of the effort is likely to take
place, but it is most affected by the erosive effect of Trumpian politics – not to speak
of other divisions within the Alliance over potential policy on Russia. The EU has
stepped up its ambitions in the defence realm over the last few years, but capability
development will remain difficult. The OSCE and UN frameworks, meanwhile, offer
interesting entry points to engage other partners but offer little more, in this context,
than liaising and mediating opportunities.
Making matters worse, the advent of a multipolar missile world has an inescapable
corollary that the demise of the INF Treaty only stresses: the question of missile
defence and, at the most fundamental level, that of nuclear deterrence. When non-
proliferation and arms control agreements fail, how do you defend against missile
threats, old and new?
3.2. A complex alternative to a revised ‘dual track’ decision
The INF Treaty was the result of a convergence of views on nuclear deterrence. This
convergence was far from easy to achieve. The United States and USSR had their
respective perspectives and interests. Within the United States and the former USSR,
these perspectives and interests have themselves been constantly subject to difficult
political arbitration. For instance, the Russian military establishment has been said to
be most unhappy with Gorbachev’s inclusion of the then recently developed OTR23
‘Oka’ missile system in the list of missiles to be destroyed under the INF Treaty.58
More recently, President Trump’s hasty comments have obscured a long-running
conversation over INF Treaty compliance and alignment with national interests
taking place within and between the executive and legislative branches of US govern-
57 Maïa De la Baume and David M. Herszenhorn, ‘Merkel joins Macron in calling for EU army to complement
NATO’, Politico, 13 November 2018: https://www.politico.eu/article/angela-merkel-emmanuel-macron-eu-
army-to-complement-nato/.
58 Stefan Forss, ‘The Russian Operational-Tactical Iskander Missile System’, National Defence University,
Department of Strategic and Defence Studies Series 4: Working Papers No 42, 2012: www.doria.fi/
bitstream/handle/10024/84362/StratL4_42w.pdf?sequence=1.20
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issues as nuclear deterrence and escalation control has to be cultivated carefully, and
not simply assumed from the Alliance’s most power member(s). The INF Treaty crisis
of 2018-19 similarly shows that support for the US position from European allies
entails a demand for a robust arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
posture.60
European agency in the INF Treaty debate is necessarily limited. But in the broader
context of a fast-eroding arms control and disarmament architecture, European
contributions are important. Such contributions, especially if they energise a wider
political and military debate, are all the more valuable that a revised version of the
1979 NATO ‘dual-track’ decision would not be sufficient to address the challenges of
a multipolar missile world.
Multilateral rules and practices in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation
are in need of support and reform, but their politicisation complicates such efforts:
President Trump’s off-the-cuff announcement that the United States would ‘termi-
nate’ the INF Treaty exemplifies how a political grammar that may resonate in
specific contexts does not accord with the needs of a rules-based, multilateral order
nor with the demands of alliance politics. While the motive for withdrawal may be
legitimate, the timeframe, narrative and one-sided approach to it might have cost
the United States the moral high ground. Meanwhile, the threat environment is fast-
changing, imposing necessary reforms and investments in military doctrines and
capabilities.
The way forward therefore implies investment in three parallel courses of action:
diplomatic activism, political leadership and smart military investments.
3.3. Multilateral diplomacy
The first line of action concerns multilateral diplomacy, where European countries
and institutions are already very active. There is no legally binding multilateral instru-
ment covering the threat of ballistic and cruise (hypersonic or otherwise) missiles.
The INF Treaty constituted an important, if biased, exception, and its demise leaves
little in this realm other than political commitments to implement MTCR or HCoC
measures. Sponsoring a multilateral treaty in due form, be it a ‘universalised INF’ or
something else, is probably too ambitious a goal. The risk of promoting such a treaty,
for instance, at the UN General Assembly, could even contribute to further
entrenching antagonistic positions among ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’, as the debates
59 Frank Jones, ‘INF Treaty Withdrawal: The Congressional Role’, War Room, 15 November 2018: https://
warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/inf-congressional-role/.
60 Robert Bell, ‘The Challenges of NATO Nuclear Policy: Alliance management under the Trump administra-
tion’, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Working Paper 105, 10 May 2018: www.fiia.fi/en/publica-
tion/the-challenges-of-nato-nuclear-policy.21
EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR MISSILE WORLDover the TPNW (‘nuclear ban treaty’) have done. Still, even if a universal or multilat-
eral INF Treaty is beyond reach, the mechanisms it instituted can offer lessons for
reinforced multilateral formats. Technological and industrial developments will only
heighten the need for common rules on UAVs, hypersonic technologies, but also
Artificial Intelligence (AI), cyber operations or even bio-technologies and 3D printers.
Concrete proposals could see the EU increase support to specific frameworks and
initiatives (e.g. the HCoC), foster international cooperation over updated methods
and definitions (for instance, what criteria should be used to differentiate drones
from cruise missiles or how to regulate intangible technology transfers or ‘ITT’),
continue to invest in Track 1.5 initiatives (for instance, online working groups
gathering policymakers and experts) and work on a European white paper on drone
and missile technology proliferation, or at least the means to have such a conversa-
tion at the European level.
The EU has a major stake in the continued relevance of international treaties and
conventions pertaining to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, space policy
or conventional arms control. The NPT, especially, should remain the cornerstone of
the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. To be a force to be reckoned with in the
NPT review process, the EU needs a more united front. That implies sorting out – at
least partially – how Member States can agree on the means to pursue nuclear disar-
mament. Upholding these longstanding efforts is important to ensure that any
meaningful conversation about missiles reinforces a multilateral, rules-based
approach to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.
Additional efforts should and will likely take place in other settings, including at the
European Council and the OSCE where, for instance, Germany spearheaded the call
for a relaunch of conventional arms control discussions. In 2016, a group of ‘like-
minded states’ (14 in total) co-signed the ‘Berlin declaration’, stating:
Confronted with the increasingly unstable security situation in Europe, we see
an urgent need to re-establish strategic stability, restraint, predictability and
verifiable transparency and to reduce military risks.
We are convinced that a relaunch of conventional arms control is one impor-
tant path towards a genuine and effective cooperative security allowing for
peace and stability on our continent.61
The group of like-minded states continues its consultations, and the effort has
resulted in the launch of the ‘Structured Dialogue’ (SD) within OSCE as the main
venue to discuss inclusively conflict of a political-military nature in Europe. However,
the SD suffers from both the OSCE’s weakness of being primarily concerned with
61 ‘Ministerial declaration by the foreign ministers of the like-minded group supporting a relaunch of conven-
tional arms control in Europe’, Federal Foreign Office, 25 November 2016: www.auswaertiges-amt.de/en/
newsroom/news/161125-erkl-freundesgruppe-konv-ruestungskontrolle-europa/285610.22
EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR MISSILE WORLDtransparency and confidence-building measures and from the more than limited
support from the United States and Russia.62
3.4. Political leadership
The second line of action concerns political leadership. Diplomatic initiatives are
important, but they require political backing to have a sustainable impact. The main
question here does not concern political differences within the EU or within NATO –
these differences have always existed, and they will remain. Rather, the issue is with
the erosive effect of self-centred, competitive political narratives, which are experi-
encing a dramatic surge in popularity both in Europe and across the Atlantic.
Trumpian politics have taken their toll on transatlantic relations. Self-centred expec-
tations of allied support and solidarity in cases like the Iran deal and rumours of
withdrawal from NATO63 only reinforced supporters of greater European ‘strategic
autonomy’. As argued by Sven Biscop:
The Trump administration seems to believe that allies are meant to pay and obey.
When it comes to Europe, this may pose a problem. During the Cold War, what was
good for the United States was good for Western Europe. But in a multipolar world
in which multiple powers are competing and cooperating with each other, this is not
always the case.64
The EU’s permanent structured cooperation on security and defence (PESCO) was
launched in December 2017, pooling the efforts of 25 European countries in defence
matters, only to be met with criticism from Washington. A surprise for NATO officials
and many diplomats in Europe, especially since American opposition seemed to
focus on risks of duplication with NATO and European protectionism in military
procurement programmes.65 It should be clear, however, that the EU is not going it
alone. In Daniel Fiott’s words:
The EU is not presently seeking strategic emancipation from all of its depend-
encies. The constellation of national interests in the EU does not yet permit it
and the Union does not have the required defence capabilities or strategic
culture, either.66
62 Peter van Ham, Modernizing conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region. The Hague: Clingendael
Report, September 2018: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-09/Modernizing_CAC.pdf.
63 Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, ‘Trump Discussed Pulling US From NATO, Aides Say Amid New
Concerns Over Russia’, The New York Times, 14 January 2019: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/
politics/nato-president-trump.html.
64 Sven Biscop, ‘Letting Europe Go Its Own Way’, Foreign Affairs, 6 July 2018: www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/2018-07-06/letting-europe-go-its-own-way.
65 Steven Erlanger, ‘US Revives Concerns About European Defense Plans, Rattling NATO Allies’, The New York
Times, 18 February 2018: www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/world/europe/nato-europe-us-.html.
66 Daniel Fiott, ‘Strategic autonomy: towards “European sovereignty” in defence?’, EUISS Brief N° 12, 30
November 2018: www.iss.europa.eu/content/strategic-autonomy-towards-’european-sovereignty’-defence.23
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pushed European allies in the direction of China or Russia, among others, for diplo-
matic support in multilateral formats, as is the case for World Trade Organization
(WTO) reform, for instance. The US administration’s withdrawal from the Iran deal
and its threats of a ‘trade war’ have already pushed the EU to look for alternative
sources of support in its sanctions policy (instituting a ‘Special Purpose Vehicle’ or
‘SPV’ to counter US sanctions on firms dealing with Iran) and trade policy (through
new trade agreements with like-minded partners like Japan, Australia, Singapore and
others).
Meanwhile, the rise of populist parties and leaders in Europe and uncertainty over
Brexit complicate the overall political landscape. This means, in effect, that American
perspectives on strategic stability, NATO politics and relationships to the EU, as
defended by the Trump administration, will probably reinforce centrifugal forces in
Europe and further undermine the good efforts of diplomats and officials upholding
the sheer value of transatlantic cooperation. Corrosive politics cannot be assumed to
be only temporary.
Both within the EU and NATO there needs to be a more concerted effort by European
countries to uphold a rules-based international order, not as a mantra but as a polit-
ically meaningful objective and interest. Self-centred political narratives can easily
stigmatise joint efforts and multilateral platforms as unaligned with national inter-
ests. Conventions, treaties and complex political agreements are easy targets in such
a context. The challenge is therefore not to resist further politicisation of these
important pillars of international cooperation and stability, but to embed them in an
ambitious and positive collective defence and security agenda. One that would make
sense to European governments and domestic constituencies. In the current context,
it may no longer be possible to argue, as Mitterrand did, that ‘the missiles are in the
East, and the Pacifists are in the West’.
Certainly not all European governments would share the same threat perception. But
they all risk being faced with tough choices in the near future.67 Should Russia decide
to deploy 9M729 regiments closer to the EU’s borders or develop new intermediate-
range missiles, what would be Europe’s posture? Should the United States pressure
European allies to deploy American intermediate-range missiles in their territory,
where would we stand? Basing options for new American intermediate-range
missiles, be they in European countries or in Asia, are all destabilising: it is difficult to
see Russia or China not reacting angrily to such deployments in their neighbourhood,
but more importantly it would be very divisive within NATO. Western European allies
would likely resist any such deployment in Eastern European countries. Without a
major brainstorming exercise on European perspectives and interests in a multipolar
67 Ulrich Kühn, ‘The New Arms Race and Its Consequences’, Valdai Club, 13 December 2018: http://valdai-
club.com/a/highlights/the-new-arms-race-and-its-consequences/.24
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remain a matter of national perspectives.
More recently, the German Foreign Minister sponsored an international conference
to ‘promote a well-informed international dialogue on the nature and implications of
the current technological trends and to discuss whether new solutions are needed to
ensure that the global arms control architecture can effectively capture new technol-
ogies’.68 This kind of effort, in relation to German activism in the context of the OSCE
and in bilateral relations with the United States, is worth supporting. It should also
lead to concrete proposals.
3.5. Military capabilities
The third line of action, of course, pertains to capabilities, especially in the military
realm. Not only do you need military forces as a guarantee when diplomacy fails, you
also need military strength to give diplomacy a chance. One condition for greater and
wider support for the EU’s multilateral agenda is to have some in-house capacities.
There are important enabling technologies (including radar, sensor technology,
propulsion, new materials, 3D printing, etc.) on which a lot of European companies,
as well as European institutions, are already working. PESCO projects and Commis-
sion-funded research projects, including those on strategic technology foresight and
‘Key Enabling Technologies’ (KETs) are an important step in a good direction. More
can and should be done, however, but the difficulty is to rally a critical mass of public
and private actors around a common sense of purpose: for instance, talking about
space policy, Commissioner Elżbieta Bieńkowska declared in January 2019: ‘in
Europe, we do not have a clear collective sense of where we are going together on
space matters’.69
However, such capabilities may help foster greater cohesiveness among Member
States, substantiate PESCO, and further energise the debate on – and political
commitments to – strategic autonomy, but they aren’t fitted to face the perils of a
renewed missiles threat from Russia, nor to address the challenges of a multipolar
missile world. Nor are they intended to: EU diplomats and policymakers have been
extremely clear that their ambition is to complement and collaborate with NATO, not
duplicate it.
The defence concepts and capabilities required to address a more complex, diversi-
fied and changing missile threat will also need to be revised, and NATO is the place
where this discussion takes place. Key concerns will remain the fundamentals of the
alliance’s nuclear forces and escalation control. But the current crisis highlights the
68 See the conference website: https://rethinkingarmscontrol.de/.
69 Her speech is available here: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/bienkowska/
announcements/11th-annual-conference-european-space-policy-opening-speech_en.25
EUROPE IN A MULTIPOLAR MISSILE WORLDimportance of other missions, including NATO’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense
(NATO IAMD). It further reinforces the need for new, networked platforms within the
alliance, and a good example of what can be achieved is the procurement of five RQ-
4B Global Hawk drones by 15 allied countries, which will be operated by – and for the
benefit of – NATO, as the Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS) system. Air defence,
especially if relations with Russia deteriorate further, will require major investments
and important choices on the part of allies.
Upstream of NATO pooling and sharing and other capability-building efforts, critical
choices will have to be made in individual European countries as well, pertaining to
military missions and hardware in a ‘multipolar missile world’. Not having the
budgetary resources of the United States, what are the key technologies, organisa-
tional reforms, infrastructure development, procurement priorities, simulation and
training programmes – not to mention budgetary choices – that European allies
should support? Only if such effort is undertaken can a European leverage be found
vis-à-vis Washington. Cooperation should be reinforced, not discarded. Political
fixations over defence spending figures risk missing the point of accompanying and
supporting the necessary upgrade of doctrines and capabilities in the face of a
changing threat environment.
Relationships with the private sector and industrial policy considerations will also
have to be managed with the view to consolidating an adjustable, competitive, high-
quality and reliable source of technologies, goods and services.26
4. CONCLUSION
The demise of the INF Treaty should not be conflated too readily with a return to the
worst days of the Cold War. The treaty had been in dire shape for many years before
the Trump administration decided it was probably time to end it. More than a cause,
the slow death of the INF Treaty is a symptom of deeper political and diplomatic
trends. The post-INF Treaty world is a fluid ‘multipolar missile world’ that shapes up
great power competition, imposes greenfield investments in the trying territory of
missile defence, challenges non-proliferation measures and introduces new varia-
bles to nuclear deterrence.
The EU cannot be caught unprepared by these changing tides. It would do well to try
its hand at an ambitious missile-related agenda, if only for the sake of clarifying its
understanding of the rapidly changing missile threat. Similarly, NATO has to adjust to
these new realities while facing destructive political forces. For the Alliance, neces-
sary reforms in deterrence options – both nuclear and conventional – will have to be
connected to a reinforced arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation agenda.
This is an important condition for EU-NATO cooperation to be further increased, and
a major condition for ongoing ambitions and projects in both frameworks to gain
political currency in Europe.
The EU should not try to salvage the INF Treaty. Certainly, the diplomatic course
should follow its path, supporting concertation between Russia and the United
States – especially on New START extension – reinforcing the OSCE’s Structured
Dialogue, discussing concrete options for MTCR and HCoC reforms and guideline
updates, and further engage with third partners via such forums and processes as the
UN General Assembly or the NPT Review Process.
However, the diplomatic and military ingredients of this European response, strad-
dling the EU and NATO spheres, must come with a degree of political leadership and
creativity that would alone ensure the credibility and sustainability of the exercise.
Concrete ideas, flagship projects with European money delivering twenty-first
century jobs and technologies will be key to domestic buy-in in many European
countries. Without a European strategy, such initiatives would be highly dependent
on a volatile political landscape; they would also add little to a transatlantic relation-
ship in need of positive reinforcements. Challenges are numerous, of course, but
pursuing a common understanding of the trends and threats of Bolton’s ‘multipolar
missile world’ would at least signal a European intention to gain a degree of agency
in the great-power dynamics that are transforming its strategic environment and
undermining the pillars of its security and prosperity. The alternative is simply for all
to be swept away by the current.27
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